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Crimea

An Rúis-Úcráin coimhlint: Cyber ​​agus faisnéis cogaíochta i gcomhthéacs réigiúnach

ROINN:

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on

cibear-chogadh

Le Tim Maurer agus Scott Janz

What lessons can we learn from Russia’s cyber and information campaigns against Ukraine? According to Tim Maurer and Scott Janz, we should expect them to become more integrated, especially in hybrid conflicts, and we need to face facts – Russia has only revealed the tip of the iceberg when it comes to its cyber capabilities (*)

Tá an choimhlint fhoréigneach idir an Rúis agus an Úcráin a bhris amach níos luaithe i mbliana ina cás-staidéar ar choimhlint hibrideach, áit a bhfuil gníomhaíochtaí cinéitice traidisiúnta faoi scáth gníomhaíochta cibear-chogaíochta agus cogaíochta faisnéise. Anois go bhfuil rialtais na hÚcráine agus na Rúise aontaithe chun téarmaí a fháil ar phlean síochána, is nóiméad maith é machnamh a dhéanamh ar an gcaoi ar fhorbair an choimhlint seo agus an méid is féidir léi a mhúineadh dúinn faoi úsáid na cibearspáis le linn coinbhleachta a mhair roinnt míonna.

Ar dtús, tá sé tábhachtach a mheabhrú nach é iarscríbhinn na Rúise sa Crimea an chéad ásc sa réigiún inar tharla rannpháirtíocht mhíleata thraidisiúnta i gcomhthreo le gníomhaíocht naimhdeach bunaithe ar an Idirlíon. Le linn Chogadh na Rúise-na Seoirsia 2008, mar shampla, baineadh úsáid as botnets agus oibríochtaí míleata cinéitiúla ar siúl chun láithreáin ghréasáin a aghlot agus chun ionsaithe Diúltú Seirbhíse Dáilte (DDoS) a dhéanamh, a sháraigh suíomhanna Gréasáin agus a d’fhág nach raibh rochtain orthu. Na gníomhartha seo láithreáin ghréasáin rialtais Seoirseacha agus na meáin nuachta dírithe go príomha, ag cur isteach ar bhealaí cumarsáide agus ag cruthú mearbhaill ag am géarchéime. Is léir go ndearnadh go leor de na straitéisí seo a ath-imlonnú san Úcráin, agus leibhéil nua sofaisticiúlachta bainte amach ag straitéisí eile.

Tá úsáid na cibearspáis i gcoimhlint na hÚcráine an-spéisiúil toisc go gcomhcheanglaíonn sé bearta cibear-chogaíochta agus cogaíochta faisnéise. Áirítear leis seo cur isteach ar cháblaí snáthoptaice agus le teileafóin phóca pharlaiminteoirí na hÚcráine, chomh maith le huirlisí mailíseacha níos coitianta mar ionsaithe DDoS agus éadan gréasáin. Léiríonn raon na gníomhaíochta seo an chaoi ar féidir cibear-chogaíocht a idirdhealú ó chogaíocht faisnéise, agus tugann sí le tuiscint gur dóigh go mbeidh an dá rud ag gabháil le gníomhartha cinéitiúla sa todhchaí.

Cúlra: Bhí úsáid na cibearspáis mar choimhlint ag dul i méid

Aiseolas

The simmering political tension inside Ukraine escalated in November 2013, when former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych abandoned plans to sign a trade agreement with the EU. Many believed this was a sign that he was seeking closer ties with Moscow. Yanukovych’s decision ghríosaíodh oll-agóidí ar bhuail cniogbheartaíocht fhoréigneach rialtais orthu. Rinne an ráig tobann foréigin seo na línte lochtanna atá ann cheana sa tír a dhoimhniú idir iad siúd atá i bhfabhar Moscó san oirthear agus iad siúd atá i bhfabhar an Aontais Eorpaigh san iarthar.

Long before Yanukovych’s flight in February and the buildup of Russian troops on the Crimean border, pro-Russian separatists began a concerted effort to discredit pro-European Ukrainians. Beginning in late November, reports cinn that Russian hacker groups were defacing and executing DDoS attacks on websites critical of the Yanukovych government’s relationship with Russia. This period was characterized by low-level hacking targeting highly visible websites, either rendering them unavailable or changing their content.

This activity took place as Yanukovych was trying to quell the growing civil unrest against his government. In addition to the use of police violence, the Yanukovych government also leveraged its control of the national telecommunications infrastructure to intimidate protestors. In late January, for example, people in the vicinity of clashes between riot police and protestors received an ominous text message on their cellphones containing the warning: “you are registered as a participant in a mass disturbance.” While unsigned, the messages chreid go forleathan a bheith seolta ag rialtas Yanukovych. Bhí an ghníomhaíocht seo mar chuid d’fheachtas faisnéise gléasta a bhí dírithe ar an ábhar a bhí á ithe ag daoine a chruthú nó a athrú chun tionchar a imirt ar a dtuairim. Threiseodh an feachtas seo de réir mar a mhéadódh an choimhlint sna míonna amach romhainn. Mar sin féin, b’éigean do Yanukovych teitheadh ​​ón tír sa deireadh agus bhí baint níos mó ag Moscó leis.

Coimhlint chearnach: Úsáid na cibearspáis le linn na coimhlinte te

On February 28, shortly after Yanukovych had left the country, unmarked soldiers, whom Russia’s President Putin later D'admhaigh le bheith ina trúpaí Rúiseacha, ghabh siad aerpháirc mhíleata i Sevastopol agus in aerfort idirnáisiúnta Simferopol. Ag an am céanna, chuir saighdiúirí armtha isteach ar cháblaí snáthoptaice, ag creachadh áiseanna ghnólacht teileachumarsáide na hÚcráine Ukrtelecom, a rinne luaite afterward that it had “lost the technical capacity to provide connection between the peninsula and the rest of Ukraine and probably across the peninsula, too.” Ina theannta sin, rinneadh teileafóin phóca de pharlaiminteoirí na hÚcráine a hackáil agus dúnadh príomhláithreán Gréasáin rialtas na hÚcráine ar feadh 72 uair an chloig tar éis do thrúpaí na Rúise dul isteach sa Crimea an 2 Márta. Grúpaí hacker tírghrá na hÚcráine mar Cyber ​​Hundred agus Null Sector retaliated le hionsaithe DDoS dá gcuid féin i gcoinne láithreáin ghréasáin an Kremlin agus Bhanc Ceannais na Rúise.

While the jamming of communication channels has been a standard practice of militaries since the advent of communication technologies, cyberspace has enabled new ways to influence a conflict’s outcome. For example, tuarascáil released in March by BAE, a British defense and security firm, revealed that dozens of computers in the Ukrainian prime minister’s office and several embassies outside of Ukraine had been infected with malicious software called Snake capable of extracting sensitive information. While the operators of the Snake malware were located in the same time zone as Moscow, and Russian text was found in its code, the evidence that the malware originated in Russia imthoisceach. Mar sin féin, léiríonn na cur isteach seo an chaoi ar tháinig úsáid na cibearspáis níos ionsaithí, ag aistriú ó iarracht a dhéanamh ábhar a ionramháil go cur isteach go fisiciúil ar cháblaí agus hacks spriocdhírithe a thacaigh le hionradh na Rúise.

As the March 16 referendum on the fate of Crimea neared, Russian hackers ramped up their campaign to discredit Ukrainian officials. This broader misinformation campaign sought to mobilize political support and discredit opponents leading up to the referendum on the region’s status in March. Similar tactics were used before the election in May to determine Yanukovych’s successor. As cur síos air by James Lewis of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Russia’s strategy is [to] control the narrative, discredit opponents, and coerce.” In fact, the day before the presidential election, Ukraine’s Security Service discovered a virus in the systems of the Central Election Commission designed to compromise data collected on the results of the election, nochtadh cé chomh cóngarach agus a bhí hackers na Rúise chun na torthaí a shabóideacht. Cyber ​​Berkut, an grúpa céanna atá freagrach as ionsaí DDoS i gcoinne trí shuíomh NATO i mí an Mhárta, á éileamh freagracht as an ionsaí.

While Ukrainian government officials and many news reports blame the Russian government for indirectly orchestrating these operations, as well as for the crude ‘hack attacks’ on Ukrainian state websites, the Russian government has vehemently denied accusations that they have any influence over these groups. Details about the relationship between pro-Russian separatists or hacker groups such as Cyber Berkut and the Russian government remain lacking. However, paralleling the conflict in Georgia, the timing of the simultaneous cyber and kinetic attacks le fios a minimum level of coordination, raising doubts regarding the Russian government’s statements.

Tá píosaí tábhachtacha eile den bhfreagra seo fós gruama, freisin: tuairimíonn cuid acu go bhféadfadh rochtain gan srian a bheith ag rialtas na Rúise ar chóras teileachumarsáide na hÚcráine, mar a dhéanann córas idirghabhála na hÚcráine go dlúth resembles sin a úsáideann an Rúis. Thairis sin, roinnt breathnóirí argóint gur léirigh rialtas na Rúise cuid mhaith srianta sa réigiún agus é ag úsáid an chibearspáis le linn na coimhlinte. Dealraíonn sé go bhfuil sé seo sochreidte ós rud é gur léirigh arm na Rúise gur féidir leis bogadh isteach agus amach ón leithinis gan smacht. Go deimhin, is beag dreasacht a bhí ag rialtas na Rúise chun a chumais mhíleata iomlána a nochtadh, lena n-áirítear a chibear-Arsenal.

Impleachtaí

Is fiú plé gairid a dhéanamh ar na hiarmhairtí idirnáisiúnta níos leithne a bhaineann leis seo. Is fiú a thabhairt faoi deara, go háirithe, ag cruinniú mullaigh NATO go luath i mí Mheán Fómhair, go bhfuil ballstáit NATO go hoifigiúil dhearbhú: “Cyber attacks can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security, and stability. Their impact could be as harmful to modern societies as a conventional attack. We affirm therefore that cyber defence is part of NATO’s core task of collective defence. A decision as to when a cyber attack would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-by-case basis.” This declaration is the culmination of the debate over Article 5 and cyber attacks which thosaigh tar éis eispéireas na hEastóine i 2007. NATO ar fáil chomh maith $20 million in ‘non-lethal’ aid to Ukraine in September with a focus on cyberdefence.

In short, the events in Ukraine as well as in Georgia in 2008 and in Estonia in 2007 have offered the world a glimpse at Russia’s cyber capabilities. Moreover, the conflict in Ukraine has demonstrated that in the digital age, kinetic action is likely to be accompanied with information and cyberwarfare – in Eurasia and elsewhere.

Comhroinn an t-alt seo:

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